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The record on subsidized credit to farmers is dismal. It shows a
significant failure either to achieve an increase of agricultural
output cost-effectively or to improve rural income distribution
and alleviate poverty.  Many of the financial institutions have
proven to be inept and to lack accountability.
Common features in  success stories are tougher  stands on
default; strict auditing and accounting procedures and financial
control; and some form of joint responsibility or liability by
small groups of  farners,  whereby default  by one  member
cancels future loans to the whole group.
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Subsidized  formal  credit to the agricultural  *  Strict  auditing  and  accounting  proce-
sector  has been  advocated  as more efficient,  dures  and forceful  enforcementi of penalties.
equitabic,  and  casier  to implement  than, say.
land  reform.  But thc  record on subsidized  credit  *  Some  form  of joint  responsibility  or liability
to farmers  is dismal.  by 'small groups  of  farmers,  whereby  default  by
onc member  cancels  future  loans  to Ihc whole
Until recently,  it was argued  that imposing  grc up.
low ceilings  on  intercst  rates and  allocating
massive  amounts  of  credit to rural financial  Policy  reform  should  take accounit the inlsti-
markets  would  yield  rural development  and  tutional  structure  of the rura.  cconomv-  in-
improve  income  distribution.  But 20 years of  cluding  the difficulty  ol asscssintg risk in rural
subsidized  credit  have  only made matters  worse.  borrowers  or knowing  hat  tlhey do with  bor-
rowed  funds  - and  recogniitioni ol thie imipor-
Low  interest  ceilings  effectivel)  distort the  tance  of existing  infonnal  (including  sharccrop-
real cost  of investment  and  transfer  incomc  to  per) credit  markets.
large landowners  (not Ihc poor);  5 perccnt  of
borrowers  reccive  80 percent  of tihe credit.  The  Gctting  credit  to small-scale  famiers  has
default  rate is higi  - particularly  among  largc  becn difficult  because  of higher  transaction  costs
landowners  - everywhere  but in East Asia,  per dollar  lent for small loans:  lack of collateral
partially  because  Lirmiers see the loans  as granis  and the  belicf that  small agenis  arc I  gcr risks
or welfare  and  cnforcement  is lax.  And credi-  than  large agents:  and patronage  and  arbitrary
tors often cxchange  loans  for political  favors.  dccisions  in favor of larger-scale  farmers.
Agricultural  credit  is intrinsically  difficult,  Organized  credit  groups  havc aiisen  to over-
because  of the seasonal  nature  of the activity,  the  comc these  problems,  but their  failure  rate has
peak-load  demands,  the convention  of  repay-  bcen high.  The key  ingredients  for  lheir success
ment once  in harvest  scason,  and  the fact that  are a coherent  system  of  incentives  consistcnt
bad luck  can strike  many  borrowers  at once.  with the informational  structure,  and  strong
Common  featurcs  in the success  stories  re-  cnforccment  procedurcs.  Somc  forn  of joint
counted  by Braverman  and  Guasch  arc thcsc:  liability  structure  is desirable  for group  lending.
Particular  care needs  to bc taken  in the  design  ol
With,lolding  of new loans  until old loans  the group,  regarding  size and incentives.
arc  repaid.
This  paper  is a p,oduct  of the Agricultural  Policies  Division,  Agriculture  and  Rural
Dcvelopmcnt  Dcpartment.  Copies  arc availablc  free from  the World  Bank,  1818 H
Strect  NW,  Washington  DC 20433.  Plcase contact  Ciccly  Spooncr,  room  J2-084,
cxtension  37570  (39 pages).
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In most  LOCs, there  Is clear  evidence  of  "urban  bias"  that  Is, government  policies
(price/tax,  Investment)  favor  residents  of  the  urban  sector  over  rural  Inhabitants.1  This
bias seems to  exist  In the  allocation  of  credit  as well.2 Nevertheless,  In absolute  terms,
the  value  of  such credit  to  the  rural  sector  has been quite  considerable.  The object  of
study  Is  not  to  Identify  the  reasons  for  the  urban  blas,  an  Important  question  In Itself,
but  rather  to  evaluate  public  credit  policies  In the  rural  sector.
Subsidized  formal  credit  has  been  advocated  on  efficiency  and  equity  grounds,
but  also  as  a much easier  policy  to  Implement than,  for  example, land  reform.  However,
the  record  on  these  policies  Is quite  dismal.  Many formal  Institutions  have been designed
to  channel  credit  from  official  sources  to  rural  agents  (farmers,  traders)  and to  address
the  perceived  shortage  of  credit.  Significantly,  It  Is the  norm that  the  operation  of  the
financial  institutlons  Is  heavily  regulated  with  controls  that  keep  Interest  rates  below
market  rates.  Although  these  Institutions  differ  from  country  to  country,  the  operating
assumptions  and policies  are surprlsingly  uniform  and as such  a coierent  analysis  can  ue
Implemented.
Given the  fairly  general  failure  of  credit  pollcies  In the  past,  a growing  literature
Is  developing  that  seeks  alternative  forme  In managing and  channeling  credit  to  rural
marketp,  that  could  eradlcate  or  at  least  significantly  reduce  the  problems  previously
encountered.  A  fair  amount  of  that  recent  work  has  analyzed  how  alternative
1See Mkhael Upton (19771.
2The agricultural  sector engages  close to 65 percent  of labor in most LDCs,  and produces an
average of 30O  percent  to 40 percent  of output.  it  receives,  thou9h, only a very low share of public
redit, e.g., 10 percent  in Bangladesh,  15 percent  in Thailand,  Philippines  and Mexicn,  and 27 percent
in  India (see Lipton [1981].  Of  course, these statistics are cast in  average terms, and  efficient
allocation  of  investment  is determineo  by marginal  terms.  But it is highly unlikely that the marginal
contribution  of investment  in the urban  sector exceeds  those in the rural sector by such a significant
degree (if at all).-2-
institutlonal  forms  could  Improve  the  performance  of  credit  policies,  using  the
experlences  from  the  fleld  and promising developments In the  thenry  of  credit  and In the
theory  of  Incentives  and organizational  design.  3
In this  paper  we  Intend  (I) to  pinpoint  the  reasons  behind  the  failure  to  achleve
the  stated  objectives  In  rural  credit  allocatlon,  many of  them coming from  within  the
Institutions  which  were  created  to  channel  credit;  and  (ii)  to  review  the  recent
developments  In the  theory  of  Incentives  and organizations  In order  to  shed  some light
on  the  process  of  Institutional  reform.
The structure  of  this  paper  Is  as follows.  In Section  11,  we evaluate  government
Interventlon  In rural  cr-dit  markets.  In  particular,  the  targeting  of  small farmers,  the
tolerated  default,  and  the  Imriact of  subsidized  credit.  In  Section  III,  we  address  the
evidence  of  the  development  of  formal  financlal  institutlons,  Including  the  success
stories.  In Section  IV, we address  the  Informational  problems In rural  credit  markets,  and
the  role  of  informal  credit  markets  and  Interlinked  land,  labor  and  credit  contracts  In
llght  of  evidence  and  recent  theory.  In Sectlon  V, we present  a review  and evaluatlon
of  the  current  developments  In the  theory  of  Incentives  and organizations  and how they
have  been  Incorporated  Into  the  analysis  of  Institutlonal  reform  to  find  more  effective
ways  to  channel  credit  to  rural  markets.
3Another direction in  the  Iterature, although not  the  main subject of  discussion here, has
focused on the interactive  effects  of credit with other, non-credi instruments  to bring about the desired
objectives.  Significantly,  many past analyses  of  evaluating  credit policy have altogether  ignored its
comparison  to alternative  instruments. Two methods  to  compare alter.-Afive  agricultural  price policies
(taxes  and subsidies)  in developing  countries  have been recently developed. One is theoretical  (Sah
&StiglRtz (1984])  and the other is operational  by Braverman  & Hammer.  See Braverman,  Hammer  &
Ahn [1983], and Braverman,  Hammer  & Gron (19871  for methodological  discussions  and kiferences to
various  country studies.  In order to modify either of these approaches  so that credi subsidies  can be
compared  with other prica (tax) instruments,  the fungibility  of credi, the information  failures  and other
imperfections  peculiar  to rural credi  markets  have to be properly incorporated.- 3 -
IL.  CREDIT SUBSIDIES, PERSISTENT  DEFAULT AND
THE PLIGHT OF THE SMALL FARMER
11.1  GOVERNMENT  INTERVENlnON  IN RURAL  CREDIT  MARKETS:  OVERALL  EVALUATION
Until recently,  conventional wisdom  held that  Imposing  low ceilings on  Interest
rates  and allocating massive  amounts  of  credit to  rural financlal markets would yield rural
development  and Improve  Income  distribution.  The arguments traditlonally set  forth  for
government Interventlon In providing subsidized Interest  rates have been numerous. The
most prevalent are  the following.  It  has been argued that  wlthout subsidized Interest
rates,  adoptlon of  technical Innovation would  be delayed and there would be under-usage
of  costly  Inputs  like  fertilizer.  Such effects  slow the  growth of  output  and  the
development  of  the agricultural sector.  It has also been claimed  that  since rural  credit
markets are notoriously Imperfect, access to  credit by farmers, particularly small  ones,
Is severely limited, and that  without government Intervention a high price of  capital would
prevail.  This would further  screen out  the small  farmers from credit markets, fostering
poverty  and worsening Income  distribution.  Lastly, It has been argued that  because of
distorted  exchange rates,  food  price controls,  Imports of  cheap food  and Inefficient
markets, farmers receive low prices for  their products, hampering  their borrowing ability.
The government might, further  Intervene and attempt  to  compensate farmers for  the
adverse effects  of  those pollcies by providing subsidized  credit.  SIgnificar.tly,  all of  the
above arguments can be seriously questioned.
The evidence of  more than twenty years of  subsidized credit pollcies Indicates a
significant failure to achleve the desired objectives.  In fact, most often  they havy made
matters worse.  Low Interest  rate  ceilings provide Income  transfers  to  loan recipients(often  not  the  poor),  distorting  the  real  rates  of  Investment  opportunitles  by
undervalulng  the  real  cost  of  capital  In different  sectors.  To  the  standard  cost  of
distorted  resource  allocatlon,  add the  specific  costs  and  consequences  of  Implementing
credit  programs  in  rural  financlal  markets  for  the  full  measare  of  Impact.  The
administrative  costs  are  not  trivial  since  they  can  amount  to  over  20  percent  of  the
value  of  the  loans  made, weli In  excess  of  the  Intermediary  Interest  Income. 4 As  we
describe  below,  these  credit  po:lcy  failures  can  be  attributed  to  basic  flaws,  Intrlnsic  to
formal  rural  credit  markets,  out  of  which arise  persistent  problems  largely  based  on
accountability  and  Infornatlonal  problems.
11.  2  THE TARGETING  OF THE SMALL  FARMERS
If  Indeed one  of  the  objectives  of  a  credit  program  Is to  reach  a  large  number
of  targeted  small rural  farmers,  then by  and large most programs can  be  judged  failures.
Despite  the  remarkable  expansion  of  credit  throughout  rural  areas  In  developing
countries  over  the  last  three  decades,  only a small fraction  of  the  farmers  In low Income
countries  seem to  have  received  or  benefited  by  such  credit.  It  has  been  estimated
that  only  5  percent  of  farms  In Africa  and  about  15  percent  In Asia  and Latin  America
have  had access  to  formal credit.  Rather  than  equalizing  Income Inequality,  low Interest
rate  credit  programs  have  Increased  It;  5  percent  of  borrowers  have  received  80
percent  of  the  credit.  Policies  that  allocate  credit  to  farmers  Indiscriminately  provide
larger  loans  to  larger  landholders  when all  credit  demands are  fulfilled.  This Is because
4The productivity  effects  of subsidized  credit have not been clearly established. For example,
conventional  wisdom states that operating  expenses  and investment  per hectare  are often higher per
borrower,  bA that production  differences  and net farm income per hectare  are not very significant  A
number of studies seem to have uncovered  an inverse  correlation  between  farm size and output per
acre (see Deolallkar  [1981] arnd  Rao &  Chotigeat  [1981]).  The reasons  for such a  relationship  are
varied but the most predominant  seem to be a disproportionately  higher labor input, mosty  coming
from  family members, in  the  smaller plots  (see Berry &  Cline 119791,  and  Fader [19Bq  for  a
discussion of the farm size and farm productivity issue).  It  is still true, though, that there is no
conclusive  evidence  on the relation  between  farm size and output per acre.-5-
larger  landholders  require  larger  loans  even  If  there  are  decreasing  returns  to  credit
per  hectare  and  per  farm  size.  This  Is  also  true  If  excess  demand  gives  rise  to
rationing.
If  credit  program  Interest  rates  are  not  market  rates--which  Is  the  case  for
most  programs  implemented  In rural  financia, ,narkets  (RFM)--they  do  not  reflect  the  true
cost  of  capital.  This  results  In a subsidy'  r  Income transfer  to  loan  recipients.  The
larger  the  size  of  the  loan,  the  larger  will  be  the  subsidy  or  Income trar.sfer.  Thus,
larger  landholders  receive  larger  Income transfers  and  Income Inequality  Increases.  The
problem Is exacertated  because  of  axcess  demand as  rat!oning  Is  not  Implemented equl-
proportlonti  to  demands.  Because  commerclal  banks  and  speclalized  farm  credit
organizations  tend  not  to  be  located  In rural  settings,  they  possess  limited  Information
about  rural  customers.  Thelr credit  allocatlon  policies  tend  to  be  based  on  observable
wealth or  aillity  to  provide  collateral.  Therefore,  they  are  not  likely  to  ration  the  large
landholders.  Moreover,  the  medium-sized landholders  are  more likely  to  be  ratloned  while
the  small farmers  are  screened  out.  Substantlal  costs  In processing  and  administering
loans,  with  returns  Increasing  as  a  function  of  loan  size,  strengthen  the  Incentives  to
maintain such  policles.5
We have  suggested  that  Interest  rate  restrictlons  Induce  banks  and  other
financlal  institutlons  to  ration  credit  In a  way  that  excludes  small farmers  from  formal
credit  markets  and thus  generates  undesirable  Inequitles  and worsens  Income distribution.
However, we should  note  that  a  laissez-faire  credit  policy,  no  restrictions  Imposed, will
.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
5To all these efficiency  arguments  in procuring loans we have to add patronage relationships
between  wealthy farmers and bankers  that will further curtail the supply of credit to small farmers.
Therefore,  given the  evidence,  we  are led to agree with many others that subsidized  interest rate
programfs  have had a  regressive  effect on  income distribution.  For example, Dale Adams, aaudio
Gonzalez-Vega,  and John von Pischke  argue strongly for this view.not  In Itself  be  a solution to  the  problem.  Targeting the  small farmers Is a  problem
whether or not  Interest  ratos  are subsidized. The reasons are the substantial costs  In
processing and administerlng  loans, with returns  Increasing as  a function  of  loan size.
As well, It  Is often  presumed  that  larger and wealthier farmers are better  credit risks,
elther  because of  thelr  ability  to  provide collateral,  because of  their  better  track
records  or because banks have better  Information on them.  Subsidized  credit worsens
the problem. It Increases the demand  for  loans at  all levels and for  all types and, given
fixed supply of  capital, the rationing to  small  farmers will be even more severe.
The consensus and natural  Inference from most of  the  studies  In this area  Is
that  for  public credit to  reach the small  farmers, a different  set  of  policies Is required.
Specific Incentives need to  be  provided for  Institutions  to  channel funds to  targeted
groups along with the design of  sensible monitoring  procedures for  information g&thering.
Without the  combination of  those  two  factors,  the  problem Is  likely  to  remaln. 8 We
further  discuss this point In Section l11.
11.3  TOLERATED  DEFAULT
Successful credit programs  have high recovery rates.  Subsidized  credit programs
also fall  In this regard, with most studles reporting low recovery rates.  Defining  default
as  a loan overdue for  repayment, these studies have Indicated default  rates  ranging,
with a few exceptions, from 30 to  95 percent  for  credit programs In Africa, the Middle
East, and Latin America. Similar  results  have been reported In South and Southeast Asia.
East Asla Is the  exception:  the high recovery  rates  for  Korea, Taiwan,  and Japan are
frequently attributed  to strong  village  cooperative systems which  have provided a strong
Incentive and enforcement system.
6See  Braverman  8 Guasch  [198eaa  on this point.-7-
Looking at the timing  of  default over the life of  a credit program illustrates some
of  the  Issues  behind default  rates.  The history  of  programs not  requiring  any
collateral--making all farmers eligible--shows that  the recovery rate  Is unusually high at
the beginning,  but  declines gradually over a program's life.  The reasons for  this demise
seem to be declining  screening quality over time, lax supervislon, and stronger  Incentlves
to  default  as  the  prospect  of  future  loans diminishes. For example,  the  BIMAS  credit
program In Indonesia,  implemented  In 1970, reports  recovery rates of  95 percent for  the
first  two years.  After  five  years, however, recovery  rates  dropped to  60 percent.
To some extent, the reasons for  those high levels of  default  can be attributed
to  a predominant self-serving  confusion that exists on the  farmer's part regarding the
nature  of  credit.  It  Is  not  unusual that  farmers  perceive  the  loans as  grants  or
welfare.  In fact,  as reported by Llpton 11980], In some South Asian languages the word
used  for  loans  from  the  government (tagal,  taccarl)  means "assistance,  grant".
Therefore,  the  reluctance  to  repay  those  loans should not  be  surprising.  Growing
evidence Indicates that  the risks of  default on loans are greater  for  large farmers who
are  nevertheless  charged lower Interest  rates  than  small farmers (see  Ames E1974],
Dadhich  E1971]).  Thus, those  who benefit  most from  tolerated  default  are  the  big
farmers  whose default/loan  ratlo  Is  highest  as  reported  by  Lipton  (1981].  This
distinction, of  course exacerbates the regressive nature of  subsidized credit  policies.
Furthermore, the  policies of  loan and crop  guarantees ought  to  be  seen as
partially responsible for  those low recovery rates  or tolerated  default.  Many  countries
(e.g., Mexico, Costa  Rlca, Philippines,-Sri Lanka, India) provide some of  that  form of
Insurance.  The objective Is to  Induce lenders to  provide more loans to  a target  group
by shifting part  of  the recovery  risk to  other agencles.  Such policies have the effect- 8  -
of  weakening  the  incentives  of  financlal  Institutions  to  collect  and  that  clearly  Impacts
very  strongly  on  recovery  rates.
The conclusions  of  many of  those  stt dies  Indicate  that  a much harder  line ought
to  be  taken  on  default  particularly  when the  reasons  are  arbitrary,  for  the  long-term
viability  and  effectiveness  of  credit  pollcies.  Enforcement,  accountability  and  Incentive
design  regarding  loan size,  term.,  renewals and new loans miust be implemened; otherwise
one  could  foresee  a  bleak  future  and  unnecessary  delays  In  the  progress  of  rural
development  and  Improvement In the  distributlon  of  Income.
IIA  INFLATION.  MONOPOLY  POUCIES  AND PATRONAGE
Subsidized loans  are  predictable  generators  of  poor  Investments,  misallocatlons,
and  borrowing  for  arbitrage.  They clearly  become more attractive  and distortive  In the
presence  of  high Inflatlon  rates  (e.g.,  L.atin America) since  most  of  the  loans  are  set  In
nominal terms.  (Although,  ofl  I  In high Inflation  countries,  such  as  Brazil, loans  tend  to
be  Indexed.  But  even  In those  cases  Inaexation  rarely  provides  complete  Inflation  risk
coverage.)  Moreover,  they  provide  significant  leverage  to  the  Individuals In charge  of
their  disbursement.  Under these  conditions  It  Is  not  surprising  that  credit  Is  allocated
as  well  In  return  for  political  benefit  or  as  a  compensation  for  favors  rather  than
according  to  need  or  efficlency.  Examples of  this  phenomenon abound  (see  Landman &
Tinnermeir  [1981]  in Bolivia and Robert  (1978]  In India for  a sampling).  This condition  Is
reinforced  by  specialized farm credit  Institutions  which operate  without  active  competition
and/or  accountability.  Monopoly power from  non-profit  Institutions  along with subsidized
credit  foster  patronage,  corruption  and  other  forms  of  Inefficiency  and  Inequality
wherever  markets  lack  the  force  of  competition.7
7For further evidence  on rural credit programs,  see  _A-MS  & Vogel [1988].- 9 -
III.  INSTITUTIONAL  DEVELOPMENTS  AND OPE'7TING  CONSTRAINTS
Slgnificant Institutlonal  developments  have taken  place In rural  credit  markets
durlng the last two decades.  A plethora of  distinct types of  organizations has emerged,
Including cooperatives, g.  ernment-owned  agricultural banks, rural private banks, multi-
purpose development  agencies with credit  responsibillties, etc.  The rationale for  such
undertakings has been the belief that the agricultural sector  Is not well served In credit
matters, that  farmers have great difficulty  accessing credit, and that when  obtained It Is
at  a  very  high and  usurious rate.  The projected  role  of  these  institutlons  was to
provide finance for  agricultural products and to stimulate agricultural Innovation and the
development  of  the sector.
However,  most of  the changes made In Institutional design have been largely of
a  superficial, window dressing type,  rather  than substantial.  The commitment  made to
them in tems  of  resources and accountability was rather weak.  The evidence ;s In the
large number of  Institutional faliures  In LDCs,  however failure  Is defined.  The viability
of  these  Institutions  could  have been  questioned from  the  start,  since  they  were
perceived or  designed to  serve  more like a welfare agency (often  not  for  the  poor)
than  a  commerclal  undertaking.  There seems to  have been little  effort  to  Integrate
deposit  taking  activities  or  to  generate  savings mobilizatlon,  a  vital  activity  for  the
long-run  success of  a credit  Institution.  Lastly, no provisions were made  to  deal with
non-compliance,  or  to  Implement  a reasonable system of  Incentives to  both lenders and
borrowers to  Induce the desired objeetives.
Having Identified  such  broad  failure,  It  might be  worth  noting  the  Intrlnsic
difficulties  of  agricultural  credit  as  distinct  from  credit  for  rural  commerce,  trade,- 10  -
retailing,  etc.  Thi3 acceptance, of  course,  renders  :  lidity  that  the  claim of  the
reluctance  of  private  banks  to  engage In  agricultural credit  and  of  the  need  for
government Intervention.  Agricultural  lending Is  much more difficult  on  a  financial
organizatlon  than  commercial  lending because of  the  more seasonal nature  of  the
activity,  the  difficulty  of  serv!ng customers geographically dispersed, the  consequent
peak-load  demands  that  are  made on  the  organization for  speedy disbursement, the
conventlon that  repayment for  working capital can be  required only once at  harvest
season,  and  because  adversities  often  affect  a  large  number of  loan  recipients
simultaneously.  The large covarlance among  the returns  of  outstanding loans and the
difficulty  to  Insure against It Is often  claimed  as one of  the major reasons for  the lack
of  Involvement  of  formal private Institutions.
Since commercial  credit  operates  In  a much smoother fashlon, It  Is  easier  for
lenders to  diversify  their  portfolios  to  cushion against economic shocks.  When  shocks
occur,  their  impact on the  commercial  borrower's ability to  repay Is bound to  be much
less severe than on the agricultural borrower.  Evidence  reveals that  Institutions  seem
to  obtain  a  better  performance In  their  commercial  credit  allocation  than  that  of
agriculture.  A thorough comparison  of  these two lines of  credit  ought to  help broaden
understanding  of which  problems  are caused by credit Institutions and pollcies themselves
and  which are  caused  by  problems outside  tne  Institution  relating  to  the  special
characteristics  o,f agricultural lending.
SUCCESS  STORIES
It  Is encouraging to  note that,there  have been a number  of  success  stories  In
the  process  of  disbursing credit  to  rural  credit  markets.  Identifying and explalning
successes are valuable In the process of  reform, In part because those cases had many- 11  -
of  the attributes  we associate with fallure.  Worth  mentioning  Is the INVIERNO  Development
Bank program, Implemented  In Nicaragua In 1975.  It  served the  region containing the
largest  number  of  small farmers and the  lowest rural  family Income.  Its  results  were
extraordinary:  participatlon rate  of  small farms was more than 80  percent;  the maize
yleld per  hectare  doubled that  of  traditlonal methods; the rate  of  adoption of  modern
technology was significantly high; and the  delinquency  rate was only about  10 percent.
Internal auditing of  local office  operatlons, cost monitorlng,  technical help for  operational
procedures and new  methods  were combined  In a policy that  supported these successes.
Expeditious loan application and  credit  disbursement was also  a  major  factor  In  the
program's  success,  together  with  long-term  credit  policy  suggested  by  efficlency
arguments.  Lines of  credit were devised for  a five-year  period with flexible schedules
with loan repayment built Into the contracts.
A different  success story  emphasizing  savings and positive real rates  of  Interest
located  In the Republic  of  Korea (Lee, Kim & Adams  E1979])  Is fairly  representative  of
most East Asian  countries.  In the 1960s, Korea Implemented  an extensive  network of
rural cooperatives. They  were organized  on three levels: primary  cooperatives  at the
township  level;  county cooperatives;  and the National  Agriculture  Cooperative  Federation
at the national  level.  Participation  rates reached  nearly  80 percent. The cooperatives
provided  farm Inputs,  farm product  marketing,  credit and savings  deposit  services,  mutual
Insurance,  and technical  education.  The  emphasis  on mobilizing  rural financial  savings  was
perhaps  the most distinguishing  feature.  While  deposits  contributed  only 20 percent of
loanable  funds In 1961, and government  funds nearly  60 percent, by 1975 the figures
reversed to 51 percent and 19 percent, respectively. A strong government  policy of
going from a negative  real Interest rates environment  to  a positive real Interest one- 12  -
was crucial.  Equally Important may have been the bottom-up design of  the cooperative
system  which  was  quite  effective  in  providing'  secure  and  dependablo  savings
opportunities for  small  farmers.
Also noteworthy Is Kenya's Cooperative Saving Scheme,  Initiated In 1970, that  Is
based on  a system of  forced  savings (von Pischke [1983]).  Cooperative members  are
mostly small  coffee  farmers.  The scheme  arranged payment  to  growers for  coffee  sales
by crediting It  to  their  accounts with the cooperative, rather  than paying cash.  Along
with positive  real  Interest  rates,  the  Cooperative's control  of  revenues generated a
vlable lending organization--a  kind of  Implicit  Insurance or  collateral scheme  which was
very successful In achieving  high participation rates  and relatively low dellnquency  rates.
A more recent  success stories  Is the GRAMEEN  Bank In Bangladesh. Evidence  of
Its  success  Is a very high participatlon rate  a.-id  a very low default rate.  While  lending
to  some of  the poorest  people on earth, It  has had one of  the lowest default  rates
ever, less than 2 percent.  Ninety-eight percent of  the loans have been paid In full  and
on  time.  This repayment rate  contrasts  quite sharply with the  10 percent  repayment
rates  experienced In Bangladesh  on loans from International development  banks and state
banks.  The three  key Institutional  Ingredients In the Grameen  Bank's lending practices
seem  to  be the following.  First, Imposing  a form of  joint liability within very small  groups
of  borrowers  Induces an  external  effect  on  the  group  enforced  by  strong  peer
pressure and group counsel. Borrowers must first  assemble  50 Individuals  from different
families  to  form a center  In the village.  They are then divided Into 10 groups with each
group containing 5 persons.  Each  group discusses together  the needs and loan uses of
each of  Its members. Initially, the two poorest members  of  each group receive the loans
and only when  they have been fully  repaid, two other members  of  the group receive their- 13  -
loans,  and  so  on.  Weekly meetings  of  the  group  are  used  to  track  the  effects  of  the
loans,  provide  suggestions  and support  and implicitly Induce  peer  pressure  to  comply with
the  terms  of  the  loans.  The second  Institutional  Ingredient  Is that  lending takes  place
at  market  or  commerclal Interest  rates.  Finally,  the  only  requirement  imposed by  the
bank  for  the  use  of  the  loan  Is  that  It  be  Income  producing  (housing  loans  being
occasional  exceptions).  Similar programs  featuring  these  Institutional  Innovations  are
being  developed  elsewhere  In  Malaysia, Indonesia,  Rwanda, Kenya,  Sri  Lanka,  Pakistan,
Egypt  and  even  In the  United  States  (a  neighborhood  South  Shore  Bank  In Chicago  and
the  new good  faith  fund  In rural  Arkansas).  This rapid  expansion  of  the  Grameen Bank
In  Bangladesh  and  Grameen-type  banks  elsewhere  will  test  If  the  success  of  these
institutlonal  Innovations  Is strongly  linked with smaliscale operations  or  If  It  can witi;,tand
largescale  implementation  with  Its  usually  problem  ridden  and  sometimes  fatal  (in
developing  countries)  bureaucratic  apparatus. 8
Other  credit  programs  with  related  Institutional  Innovations  which have  enjoyed
some  success  have  been  the  voluntary  joint  liability  and  mandatory  joint  liability
programs  In  Zimbabwe.  Under  the  former,  loans  are  made and  accounted  for  on  an
individual  basis,  but  the  farmer  has  to  show  membership In  an  active  cooperative  or
farming  group.  Emphasis Is  placed  on  mutual  ald  and  collective  responsibility.  In the
event  of  a  member's default,  the  loan  conditions  do  not  require  that  the  other  members
cover  the  loan.  Rather  It  stipulates  that  the  whole  group  loses  eligibility  for  future
loans.  Under  the  alternate  mandatory  joint  liability  program,  responsibility  for  loan
administration  and repayment rests  with the  group  as a whole.  The group  requests  loans
8Hossain (1986] provides  an extensive  analysis  of the Grameen  Bank.- 14  -
and Is  responsible for  division among the  members  and  for  selling and marketing the
group  output.  Therefore,  there  Is  full  joint  liability, automatically enforced  via  the
control  of  the  product.  Loan recoveries have been at  the  70 percent  range for  the
voluntary  joint  liability program and at  the  80 to  92 percent  range for  the mandatory
jolnt  liability program. These loan recovery rates  compare  very favorably with those for
farmers In the same  region, based on individual  liability.  The recovery rates  there were
In the 50 percent  range. 9
Another recent  success story  has been the  FUNDE  credit  program in Nicaragua.
It reached very high participation rates and the default rates  very significantly low.  The
strength  of  the  program was  the  commitment  by  the  government lending agency  to
conduct  on-site  periodic tralning  and educational sessions for  farmers,  to  have and
Implement  extensive monitoring  and accounting procedures on the use of  the funds, and
to  hold the  loan recipients accountable.  Moreover no new loans were to  be given until
old loans were repaid. 10
In summary,  the critical common  features  In many of  these programs  were (I) that
no new loans were to  be given until old loans were repaid, Indicating that  Intertemporal
linking of  loans  Is  an  effective  way to  Induce compliance, (11)  strict  auditing  and
accounting procedures, suggesting the value of  monitoring technologles for  Inducing  the
desired behavior, and (111)  some  form of  joint  responsibillty or liability by small  groups of
farmers, whereby default  of  one  of  the  members  would Imply  the  cancellation of  any
future  loans to  the whole group.
9See  Bratton  [1986]  for a detailed  analysis  of the Zimbabwe  case  study.
10For  a comprehensive  evaluation  of the FUNDE  program  see Tendier  et al., [1985].- 15  -
IV.  INFORMATIONAL  PROBLEMS
IV.  CREDIT  RATIONING
In addition to  the  problems  indigenous to  rural  credit  markets described above,
these markets also face  the  Informational  problems so  prevalent In any credit  market,
that  result  In rationing of  loans In equilibrium  with non-clearing market Interest  rates.
The two  most common  Info-rmational  problems are adverse  selection  and moral hazard
problems. While  the former refers  to the Inability of  lending Institutions to  know or  Infer
the  risk  characteristics  of  the  borrowers, the  latter  refers  to  the  Inability of  knowing
the  actions taken  by  the  borrowers, regarding thelr  use of  the  funds  and their  care
and effort  on  the Investment projects.  In turn,  these problems  affect  market Interest
rates  In the following fashion.  First, the possibility ol  default and Ilmited  liabilities place
a  floor  on  the  distributlon  of  net  returns  to  borrowers.  In a  sense, this  creates
incentives  to  choose  riskier  projects  since  the  down risk  Is  limited.  BorrowereV
Investment choices to  some extent  determine default  risk.  These choices cannot be
observed  by  lenders  and  thus  cannot  be  specified  In  loan  agreements.  Lending
Institutions  realize  that  high Interest  rates  and  large  principals are  relatively  more
attractive  to  risky borrowers; this Is the adverse selectlon effect.  Interest  Is paid only
when the  borrower does not  default.  Second, there  Is  also the moral hazard effect.
Increases In the Interest  rate, while raising the return  on successful loans, may  lead to
adverse shifts  In the  risk  composition  of  lenders' portfolios,  Increasing the  probability
of  default.  It follows that  Increases In the Interest  rate  may lead to  a decrease In the
expected returns  to  lenders.  In sum, the moral hazard and adverse selection effects- 16  -
may render  a market-clearing  interest  rate  non-optimal,  leading  to  credit  rationing.11in
the  context  of  RFMs, the  moral  hazard  aspects  concerning  choice  of  projects  Involve
choice  of  production  technology,  effort  level,  use  of  loans  (production  versus
consumptlon)  and Input  mix.
In the  rural  credit  markets,  the  adverse  selection  problem seems less  severe  for
the  Informal  or  village  money  lenders  than  for  the  organized  commercial  lending
Institutlons.  The fact  that  the  default  rate  for  the  latter  Is much higher  than  for  the
former  Is an  Indlcation  of  that  observatlon.  The Information  available to  the  local  money
lender  about  the  loan  applicants  Is quite  extensive,  more accurate  and  easier  to  obtaln
than  for  the  organized  or  formal  Institution.  And, Indeed, as  the  evidence  Indicates,  It
Is  a  significant  problem  for  organized  lending,  especially  for  government  backed
Institutions  where  screening  borrower  creditworthiness  Is  not  carried  out  very
thoroughly.
Moral hazard problems are  quite  prevalent  for  both  ttle  organized  and the  Informal
credit  markets.  Monitoring  cost  can  be  quite  large.  The  evidence  suggests  that  a
significant  portion  of  the  loans  ends  up  being used  for  consumption  purposes  or  other
non-productive  uses.12 Likewise, finiteness  of  borrower's  wealth and Insufficient  credit
Instruments  to  Induce  the  right  actions  are  generic  elements of  rural  credit  markets.  In
particular,  In many LDCs property  rights  are  not  well defined  (e.g.,  Feder  (1987]  and
Blnswanger & Mcintire  (1986]),  and  therefore  collateral  Is  not  available on  an  extensive
l1 See Stiglitz & Weiss  [1981. 1983], Keeton [1979], and Allen [1983] for further elaboration  on
these po.its.
12Aithough  that use of a loan in itself does not imply necessarily  inefficiency  or  undesirability.- 17  -
basis.  In some areas, land, usually the primary asset of  many  farmers, Is not  allowed  as
a collateral.
Thus, In Itself,  a policy of  freeing  Interest  rates  on loans will neither  eliminate
the ratloning of  the small  farmers In the credit market nor necessarily Improve  their rate
of  loan allocations as a direct effect.  However,  Indirectly the small  farmers can benefit,
since, at  the higher Interest  rate  there might be a reduction  In the  demand  for  loans
from the larger farmers, and thus the residual amount  of  funds available  to  small  farmers
mlght be  larger  (see  Bell &  Srlnivasan [1986]  and Braverman  & Guasch [1986b]).  If
nothing  else,  market  rates  will decrease  the  Incentives for  patronage  and  arbitrary
decisions, thereby  improving the  regressive  nature  of  the  current  subsidized credit
program.
Lifting  Interest  restrictlons  will  Induce, on  efficlency  grounds,  an  equilibrium
Interest  rate  differentlal  sensitive to  the size of  the land holding If  It  Is perceived to
be correlated with rlsk of  default and also sensitive to  the size of  the loan application,
given the  Increasing returns  to  scale of  processing loans.  Since equity Is one of  the
criteria we are concerned with, government Intervention to  absorb the higher transactlon
costs  of  small loan application might be  warranted, but  only  when the  "government
failures", mentioned  above, can be eliminated.
1V.2  INFORMAL  LENDING  AND  INTERUNKiNG  OF CREDIT  CONTRACTS
WiTH  LABOR  AND  LAND  CONTRACTS
Informal lending was once the only form credit  took  In rural  settings.  Evidence
suggests that  as farm size Increases, private credit  sources, village moneylenders  and
pawnbrokers, chit  funds with an array of  Implicit  Interest  rates  and friends or relatives- 18  -
become  less Important than banks.  With  the Implementatlon  of  development  plans, official
lending complements  but  clearly does not  supersede Informal  sources.
Sample  surveys  supplying the  Information on  the  extent  of  Informal  lending
practices  Indicate that  thelr  volume Is far  greater  than that  of  organized Institutions.
Informal lending Is  characterized by  a much shorter  processing ti,r,e, better  screening
techniques or enforcement devices (noted In the lower default rate),  and higher Interest
rates,  with  a  medlan neariy twice  as  high and a  variance  much higher than  that  of
institutionalized credit rates  (see Slngh  [1968], Harris (1982], Bottomley  (1975] and Desal
(1983]).
The lower delinquency  rates  reported for  Informal credit  sources are to  a large
extent  due to  better  assessment of  creditworthiness, ability to  exert  social pressure
for  repayment, and the  frequent  practice  of  tying  (interlinking) credit  contracts  with
other  Input or output  contracts.  Documentation  of  the use  and characteristics  of  the
latter  practice  Is quite extensive.  Sharecropping  contracts  are quite often  Interlinked
with credit  contracts  (e.g., BharadwaJ  [1974], Bhadarl  (1977], Bardhan  (1984J, Blnswanger
et  al. [1984], Bell & Srlnlvasan  (1985]).  Credit contracts  between landlords and tenants
are often  In the form of  production loans and tied to  the purchase of  fertilizer,  seeds,
and other forms of  capital (see Singh,  [1984, Ch. 10]; Braverman  & Stigiltz [1986a]) with
different  tenants  pa,ing different  Interest  rates  on their  loans (see  Bardhan  & Rudra
[1978]).  These Interlinkage practices  have been  viewed as  a  way to  address  the
adverse selection problem (Braverman  & Guasch (1984])  and the  moral hazard problem
Indigenous to  these markets (e.g., Braverman  & Srlnivasan  [1981],  Braverman  & StiglItz
(1982],  Mitra (1982],  and Bell & Zusman  [1980]).  (For  an elaborate overview of  this
literature,  see Braverman  & Guasch  (1986].)- 19  -
The main  .concluslon pf  the  Interlinking theory  for  policy is  as  follows.  Partial
reforms  In credit  markets alone, such as ceilings on  the  Interest  rate  In the  Informal
market or  disallowing  credit  linking, may decrease efficiency,  often  without Improvement
In the distribution of  Income. Sound policy reforms, therefore,  r;aed to  take account of
tle  Institutlonal  structure  of  the  particular  rural  economy.  Simultaneous  reforms  In
several markets are required as well as recognition of  the Importance  of  existing Informal
credit markets.
It  should be remembered,  however, that  given the prevailing "urban bias" In most
LDCs, Lhese  arguments cannot  be understood as  advocating the  Increase of  overall
subs!dization of  the  urban  sector.  Similar arguments concerning accountability  and
misuse of  funds  should  be  applied to  the  urban  sector  as  well.  In  addition,  the
evaluation of  a set  of  particular  subsidies to  agriculture  should be  conducted In the
overall economic context.  If there are sustained and successful political pressures to
cibsldize  the  activities  In  the  urban  sector,  which are  often  non-economic and
regressive, utilizatlon of  countervailing subsidies to  the agricultural sector  as  "second
best"  Instruments  are  legitimate options  to  consider  under  acceptable  Institutlonal
structures. 13 The "first  best"  alternative is clearlv to  remove the urban bias directly.
13see Braverman  & Kanbur  [1986]  for an analysis  of agricultural  price  reform  in the face of
sustained  urban bias.- 20 -
V.  AN INSTITUTIONAL  APPROACH:  THEORY  AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS
V.1  OVERVIEW
From our  analysis of  the  credit  polllels  undertaken In rural  markets in  LDCs
durlng the  last three  decades, we can Infer that  by  and large the root  of  the problem
see,iie  to  be  the  following.  Flrst,  the objectives  of  those policies are  not  altogether
clear or  expilclt.  Second, even when  they are, there seem  to  be confiltIng  goals stated
or  an underlying Inconsistency.  Third, the mechanism  or  technology to  Implement  these
objectivos  Is  not  well specifled.  Furthermore, even  when there  Is  a  well-defined
mechanism,  the  Incentive system for  the  Individuals  or  Institutions  rosponsible for  tholr
undertaking  Is  not  fully  compatible wlth  the  proposed  objectives.  Therefore,  the
reported high failure rate  of  past credit pollcies should not  be surprising.  Perhaps the
common  perceptlon was that subsidized credit would be the magie  wand  which  when  waved
would make everything turn  out  all right.  But as we have seen, subsidized credit  has
made  matters even worse.
The problems  of  objective  definitlon ought  to  be easy  to  correct,  but  clearly
conflicting goals cannot be expected to  be obtalned simultaneously  wlth a llmited set  of
pollcy Instruments.  The main challenge, however, ought  to  come In the  design of  the
Implementation  technology, namely,  the Institutional structure  and the  Incentive schemes
most  appropriate  to  Induce the  desired objectives  along with  a  strong  enforcement
policy.  Unfortunately, llttle  conceptual work to  date has been devoted to  this task  In
the economic professlon.  Following  the decline In attentlon  to  the "Institutlonal school",
modern  economic  literature  has  largely  overlooked  the  analysis  of  Institutions,- 21 -
inotitutional  change and  reform  mochanisms  In  general, treating  them as  exogenous
elements  seldom  analyzed wlth any rIgor.14
More recently with new  developments  In the theory of  Incentivoe and institutlons,
Internal  organizatlon and ratlonallty,  a  flurry  of  new work  In  Institutional  reforms  is
beginning to  appear.  Attentlon  Is belng focused  on  soclal norms, historical  patterns,
legal systems, management  procedures institutlonal deslgn and Incentive schemes.  The
process of  reform is not  an easy one, but  It has to  be confronted  If slgnificant galns
In development  ought  to  occur.  The Issue of  the  ratlonallty  of  Institutions  and thelr
resistance to  reform has been very clearly stated  by Glover 1198653
mIn  understanding  the logic of Institutlons,  we  must  expand  tholr definition of rationality.
most  structural  roforms  of Institutions  like  pubi/c  enterprises  or goernmnt  inlotrleo  ar
often short  circulted  bY  the Informal  managemnt  procedwos  and  presswre  fro  the outoldo.
It  Is often In the Interest of bureaucrats  to maintain  compicated  procedres,  red tape,
departmentalism  and  so on. In order to maintaln  control oer  Information  and  control their
power. A complicoted  system  gives  old timers  skillod manipulation  power  over clients and
advantage  over  newaomers.  Instltutlonal  reform  must  therefore  penetrate  the Informal  logic  at
work behind  the  formal structure and provide concrete  and consistent Incentives  for
Individuals  to modify  thelr behavior.m
The search for  alternativo Institutlons  to promote change and rural development
Is  becoming  of  age and understandably so.  As the  East Asla experience and other
success storles  Indicate, the role  of  an appropriate institutlon  as an enforcer  and a
transmitter  of  incentives,  motivatlon,  and  Inducer  of  savings  Is  essential  for  economic
development.
Even when the socio-political  environment permits then,  price mediated  markets
fall In the presence of  Informational  asymmetries  and foster  orportunitles  for  arbitrary
14Noted exceptions  are Arrow's 1974] el  uent exposhion  of  the benefits  and llmits of
organizations,  followers  of the Simon  school  and Williamson  [19751. Institutional  aspects  are  also
strongly  emphasized  in the works  of North  & Thomas  [1973],  Ruttan  [1982]  and Schultz  [1968].  This
latter  work  is exposRted  in Schuh's  [1981]  presidential  address  to the MEA.- 22  -
decisions.  Thus  more  elaborate  contractual  arrangements have  to  be  used  in
conjunction with the price system, or  when prices do not  exist, or  fall  to  provide the
correct  signals as  substitutes  for  the  price system.  Recent studies In the  areas of
Incentives and organizational design have provided highly significant  Insights and have
developed seemingly promising methodologies and  results  for  Improving contractual
arrangements and Institutional efficiency.
V.2  INCENTIVES  AND  ORGANIZATIONAL  DESIGN:  THE SUPPLY  SIDE
In the context  of  the theory  of  organizations, credit  dispensing Institutions  are
seen as  intermediaries between several  parties.  The government or  lending agency
(principal) establishes the  objectives  to  be  accomplished  and designs a  contract  or
reward structure  with the  financial Institution  (intermediary).  The reward structure  Is
designed to  be  sensitive to  the  desired accomplishments. The financial Institution,  in
turn,  generates another contract  or  sub-contract  with the  farmers (agents) or  wlth a
subset  of  them.  The nature  of  that  contract  will, of  course,  be  Influenced by  the
structure  of  the previous contract  and by  the Information available to  all parties.  The
system can be viewed  as a three or more tiered structure  or as a sequence of  nested
principal/agent relationships.  As well, the  financial Institution  itself  Is a  collection of
overlapping prlncipal(s)/agent(s) relations.  Each layer In the hierarchy of  an organizatlon
can be  thought of  as the  agent for  the  level just  above It  and the  principal for  the
layer below It.
The theory  has been concerned with the organizational structure  and the design
of  Incentive mechanisms  most conducive to  a reduction In Inefflencies In the undertaking
of  the objectives.  Incentive design Is  Implemented  on at  least two levels.  First,  It  Is
directed at the Institution Itself (i.e., managers,  supervisors and loan officers)  to  Induce- 23  -
them to  behave appropriately.  Specifically, to  contribute  the desired or optimal amount
of  effort,  reduce leakages from the system, eliminate  or  minimize  patronage, screen loan
appilcatdons  according to  bona fide  economic  principles and to  comply with stated  loan
portfollo  targets.  Secondly, incentive design Is  directed  at  the  loan recipients,  the
farmers, to  Induce them, when approprlate, to  select  the desired use  for  the  loan and
to  comply  with the repayment schedule.
Nested relationships have appeared mostly In the  context  of  the  theory  of  the
firm and Its  Internal organization (Calvo & Wellisz  [1979],  Stigiltz t1979],  Rosen E1982],
Milgrom  & Geneakopoulos  (1984],  and Guasch (1985],  among  others).  These agents  In
the multi-layered structure  of  the firms, however, were severely limited In the range of
strategies  they could Implement.  Their behavior was rather  passive.  This literature  has
shown how shirking and Inefficiency  can  trickle  down a  hierarchy.  If  Incentives  are
Inappropriate for  the principal or head to  monitor, a low supervisory effort  will result  In
the  middle  tier,  which leads to  a  low productivity  effort  In the  bottom tier.  This work
also draws conclusions on the optimal span of  control and size of  the vertical structure
as well as on wage differentials  and Its  implicatlons  for  Income  distribution.
Principal/agent  models offer  a  theoretical  paradigm within  which managerial
Incentive problems  can be studied.  The agent's activities  are usually represented by a
stochastic technology that  he operates.  The agent's compensation  scheme  Is designed
by  the  prlncipal to  maxlmize  his objectives  subject  to  the  constraint  that  the  agent's
opportunity  costs  are covered.  For example,  suppose the  technology Is of  the  form
x-x(a,z),  where  x  Is output,  a  Is the agent's effort  and  z  Is a stochastic variable
not  observable to  any party.  Then an Incentive scheme  Is a  sharing rule  s(x).  The
principal's design problem Is one of  Inducing the agent to  take a particular action,  a,- 24  -
and  finding the  sharing rule  that  will cause the  agent  to  take  that  action.  Then a
Pareto optimal  design  (a. s(a))  maxlmizes  the principal objectives or welfare subject  to
the  constraint  that  the  agent  covers  his opportunity  cost  and that  the  sharing rule
Induces the  agent  to  select  action  a.  That  design  gives  rise  to  contractual
arrangements that  are Pareto optimal  relative  to  Incentive constraints.  That literature
has contributed  substantially to  understanding the nature of  the managerial  relationship
and to  the type of  contracts  that  should be used given Informational  constraints  (see
Holmstrom  &  Tirole  [1988]).  Although it  has  been  most  concerned with  two-tiered
structures,  principal(s) and agent(s), ignoring nested relationships of  the  sort  exposed
above  and  the  Incentives  they  generate,  It  can  be  extended to  higher  dimension
organizations.  When there  are  more  than  two  layers  or  nested  principal/agent
relationships and each element In  the  structure  can  take  an active  role  In Issuing
commands,  designing reward structures  and  conveying Information, the  possibility  of
collusion among  two or more adjacent parties In the structure  should not  be ruled out.
Evidence of  coalitions and covert  transfars  within organizations Is  quite ample
(see  Section  II  above and  Crozier  [1967]  and  Dalton [1959]).  Informatlon can  be
routinely  manipulated,  either by  concealment  or  distortion.  Reciprocity and the  sharing
of  favors  seem to  be qulte  prevalent at  all levels In organizations.  Tirole [1986]  has
analyzed the  factors  likely to  induce this type  of  collusion. He considers mechanisms
with built-in  disincentives providing a basis for  control of  such behavior and establishes
the  tradeoffs  of  a centralized reward structure  relative  to  a delegated or overlapping
reward structure,  or to  a mixture of  both types.  He also provides a characterization of
the collusion contracts.  Such research Into the lncentiva and Informational  structure  In
nested relationships can shed considerable light on the subject of  Institutional refom.- 25  -
When  thers  Is more than one agent associated with a given principal (a choice In
the  context  of  organizatlonal design), or  when the  latter  has access  to  performance
data  on  other  agents  In analogous situations,  new Incentive schemes, "contests"  or
"tournaments" which are  based solely on observed performance rank, become feasible.
Under a contest  scheme  the  remuneratlon of  any agent  Is based on  how well she has
done relative  to  other  agents  In similar positions.  The advantage of  contests  over
more general schemes Is  twofold.  First,  there  are  less  nformational requ'rements. A
contest  rewards agents  solely on  their  performance rank  not  on  the  value of  the
output  Itself,  a  measurement  not  always avaliable.  In  sum, contests  are  based on
ordinallty as opposed to  cardinallty.  Second, contests  have the abillty  to  compensate
automatically for  common  risks  or  shocks or  changes In conditlons or  risks  common  to
all agents.  As such, the  agents or  farmers behave as  If  they were not  affected  by
that  risk,  ylelding a  general gain In efficiency.  Many firms, at  least  In the  developed
world, use  these schemes Internally to  Induce the desired actions or  amount of  effort.
Also, It  Is quite  common  for  the  remuneration of  top  managers  to  be  llnked with their
performance In relation to  that  of  the  average of  the top  third  firms In the  Industry.
These  commonly  observed  schemes have been  studied  by  Lazear  &  Rosen (1981],
Hoistrom (1982, 1983], Nalebuff & Stigiltz [1983],  Green & Stokey (1982], Bhattacharya
& Guasch (1988] and Guasch  [1985].  These schemes  can often  approximate  the  first-
best  allocation,  especlally when the  number of  agents  Is  large.  The advantage of
contests  over  other  schemes Is  greatest  when the  risk  assoclated with  the  common
environmental variable  Is  large  because  contests  control  for  that  kind  of  risk
automatically.  Overall, contests  can  be  quite  desirable  and  useful  for  Information
gathering.  Moreover, rural credit markets seem to  possess many  of  the characteristics_  26  -
that  make contests  effective.  All lending  institutions  are faced with similar  options and
problems,  all loan officers  tend to  face a similar pool of  farmers and loan applicatlons
and all farmers In a given area are subject to  the same environmental  risks.  Of course,
contests  will be useful across  areas where environmental  risks  differ,  unless they can
be properly handlcapped.
Furthermore, under these  Incentive schemes significant  devlations from  optimal
actlons  are  easily  Inferable,  unless  there  Is  full  collusion,  an  unlikely  and  quite
unsustainable event.  Those studies suggest that  reorganizing Institutions  Into sevei Al
parallel divislons,  forcing  them to  compete with each other,  and  basing rewards on
relative performance In the disbursement  of  funds or  loan  -wrtfollo, can alleviate some
of  the  problems associated  with past  credit  policies, exposed above.  In addition, a
rotation  policy of  key employers  would lessen the benefits  those Individuals  might derive
from undesirable policies since  the  benefits  of  misallocation, patronage  and collusive
behavior would be  short  lived.  While  some efficiency  derived from  scale  effects  or
learning, may be lost,  the Incentives for  misallocation  and patronage can bs significantly
reduced.  Likewise, similar schemes  can  be used to  allocate credit  among farmers and
Include Its  desired use with the terms and renewals of  new loan options based on thelr
relative performarce In loan repayment  or production levels.
A  complementary  approach developed by  Sah &  Stigiitz  [1986],  considers the
architectural  design of  organizatlons and the  quality  of  decision making.  Presuming
honesty  but  human error,  they  characterize  the  optimal  architecture  In  terms  of
minimizing  a  function  of  Type-I  and  Type  II errors.  Their framework can  easily  be
adapted to  Include strategic  behavior and multiple layers.  Such a  loan or  project
processing  framework can  be  helpful  In  controlling  for  arbitrary  decisions,  quite- 27  -
pervasive In credit  lending activitles,  since the  design of  the organizational structure
can  affect  the  frequency  of  those  decislons.  Different  methods In processing and
evaluating  loans affect  the  composition of  the  final  portfolio  and the  incentives to
promote arbitrary  decisions.  Two elements  are particularly Important.  One Is the number
of  units  (loan officers)  that  have to  approve a loan before  It  Is granted.  The second
element Is  the  number of  outlets  to  which a  loan application can  be  submitted.  Of
course,  the  penalty  assessed to  the  loan officer  found  to  be  engaging In arbitrary
decisions Is also of  critical Importance. In those studies, a cost-marginal gain tradeoff
of  additional units Is used to  determine the optimal  organization.
Studies In this  area (such as  Sah & Stiglitz [1986],  Guasch [1985],  and Rosen
t1982])  are  generally concerned with the  design of  the  Internal organization of  the
institutlons  disbursing funds or  selecting projects.  Specifically, the  Issues considered
are the  size and architecture  of  the  system, the height of  the  hierarchy, the span of
control,  the assignment  of  responsibillties and the ratio  of  supervisors to  supervisees.
The general  Idea  Is  to  consider,  given  (I)  a  fixed  supply of  funds,  (II)  a  set  of
obJectives,  and  (III)  an  estimated  volume of  loan  applicatlons, how  to  design  the
organizatlon such that  the  final portfolio  of  loans conforms as closely as  possible to
the  desired one  In terms of  structure  and performance.  If  we denote  by  n  the
number  of  hierarchical layers, by  s,  the number  of  decision units  at  layer  I  and by
cjl  the size and number  of  decisions units wlth  j  at layer  1,  the theory's  objective
Is to  solve  for  n,  sl,  and  cjl.  The Inputs at  each node are budget  levels, loan
applications, and commands  regarding targets  and recommendations.  The outpilts  Include
targeting  budget  levels,  processing  time,  decision  on  loan  applications  and  loan
applicatlons themselves.  The history  and status  of  past  and outstanding portfolio  of- 28  -
loans  is  used as  well to  describe the  performance of  each node for  evaluation and
Incentive design purpose.  Clearly, the larger the number  of  nodes through which a loan
application must pass, the more likely it  Is to  conform to  the set  of  objectives  (that Is,
minimization  of  Type 11  errors)  but  also the larger the transaction costs  In terms of  time
and human  resources  involved.  In addition, the more centralized and linked to  several
nodes loan decisions are,  the  less the  likelihood of  arbitrary  decisions regarding how
allocation will be made.  Also, specialization of  nodes and chalns of  the  Institutions  by
size  of  loan applicatlon would facilitate  the  targeting  of  special groups,  In particular
small farmers, and would lower transaction costs.
This conception can be tied  to  the  design of  Incentive mechanisms  to  elicit the
right  behavior from  the  agents.  Different  architectural  structures  Induce different
Information sets  and  since  Incentives  are  largely  based on  generated  or  available
Information, the  links between incentive schemes  and architectural design arise.
While  stating the objectives to  be accomplished  by Incentive design Is quite clear,
their  implementation  Is less so.  Part of  the  Incentive design problem Is to  decide which
set  of  Instruments (variables) the principal ought to  use.  Clearly, the more Instruments
the principal uses the more effective  will be the Incentive scheme  he can design for  the
agents.  However, each Instrument requires  monitoring some aspect  of  the  agent's
behavior and that  Is costly.  Therefore one should consider the set  of  feasible options
and choose the  most efficient  among them.  For  example,  the  choice of  Input versus
output  Incentive schemes or  a  mixture of  the  two  Is  not  an obvious one  when the
monitoring costs  are taken Into account.  Thus the question of  which Instrument subset
and which monitoring technology one ought to  use  is of  utmost importance In incentive
design.  The answer  to  that  question  clearly  depends In  part  on  the  nature  of- 29  -
Information  flows,  accounting  procedures  and  the  organizational  structure  of  the
institutlon.  Since these elements  can be affected  by Institutional reform, one ought to
consider them explicitly In any such analysis.
Lastly,  In  this  subsection  we address  the  effects  of  repeated  Interactions.
Since the  re'ationship between any two adjacent links of  the  chain of  disbursement Is
often  repeated,  a  dynamic framework in  the  design of  Incentive contracts  might be
appropriate.  As such, consideration of  the distinction between the Incentive effects  of
short-term  and long-term relationships Is warranted.  Feasible  long-term relationships are
advantageous In Incentive design to  the extent that  they can escape the inefficlencies
usually associated with the  short-term  equilibria or  one shot  deals.  The literature  In
repeated  moral hazard (Radner E1984])  or  trigger-point  strategies  (Porter  [1983])  Is
quite  useful  In this  context.  Several rules  for  assessing the  relative  and absolute
performance of  different  layers In the  structure  could be compared and evaluated In
regard  to  the  environmental  constraints.  Along these lines, In a long-term relationship
(the length of  which Is derived endogenously), an Incentive scheme  can be designed to
approximate  an efficient  allocation.  This assertion does not Imply  that  short-term  credit
ought to  be ellminated. In fact,  a fair  percentage of  small borrowers seem to  prefer
such credit  with low transaction  costs  (I.e., credit  for  working capital rather  than  for
Investment) and It can be efficient.  It does not  rule out  either the use of  the lending
Institution's  use  of  discretionary  power to  use  short-term  credit  as  a  screening or
Informatlon gatherlng device.  In such  a  situation,  the  principal offers  a  first  term
Incentive scheme and observes  some measure of  the  agent's  first  term performance
which depends on  the  agent's ability and contributed  effort.  In the  second, term the
principal updates the  Incentive scheme  and so  on.  In effect,  a long-term relationship- 30  -
could be  governed by  a  sequence of  short-term  contracts.  The argument, based on
efficiency  grounds, Is that  long-term relationships generate desirable Incentives and that
long-term credit  contracts  ought to  be an option available to  rural borrowers.
V.3  DEVELOPMENTS  IN COOPERATIVES  AND  GROUP  LENDING:  THE DEMAND  SIDE
As  described above the  three  principal obstacles  to  obtaining credit  for  the
smallscale  farmers have been
I.  much higher transaction costs  per dollar lent  for  small loans, a
consequence of  the large positive scale economies  of  the  loan
processing technology (processing costs of  small  loans can range
from 10 to  40 percent  of  the  loan vaiue, I.e., Adams  & Nehman
(1979],  or  Salto & Vllianueva [1981],  and Braverman  & Guasch
t1987]).  Also the long processing times for  loans In the formal
markets might rencier them Inapplicable;
II.  lack of  collateral and the  bellef,  real  or  perceived, that  small
agents are riskier In lending  than larger ones (I.e., Gonzalez-Vega
[1984],  Carter [1987],  and Braverman  & Guasch  [1987]);  and
ill.  the  patronage  and  arbitrary  decisions  of  some  lending
agents/institutions  In favor  of  larger-s^ale farmers (i.e., Ladman
& Tinnermeler  [1981]  and Robert [1978]).
To  overcome these  obstacles  It  has  been  common  for  farmers  to  resort,
sometimes  unilaterally and sometimes  as a result of  favorable government  policles, to  the
formation of  organized credit groups or  cooperatives.  There are many types of  credit
groups  and  cooperatives  ranging  from  the  purely  nominal or  umbrella organizatlons
without  much member  interaction  to  those  fully  coordinated  In  all  aspects  of  their
operatlons  Including production  decisions among members.  Motivation behind their
Inceptlon, organizatlonal structure,  Incentive schemes,  enforcement procedures, tradition
and cultural  legacy are  important factors  In determining  their  effectiveness.  While  the- 31  -
credit  groups  are  usually smaller In size  and formed for  purely  borrowing purposes,
reducing transactlon costs,  the  rlsk  of  default  and the  risk  of  Income  variability, the
cooperatives are larger In size and more encompassing.  The acquisition of  credit Is just
one of  their  joint  activities.  For  example,  cooperatives  usually pool resources  for
production and marketing purposes.  In additlon, thelr degree of  joint  liability Is variable.
While  some cooperatives espouse joint liability, others show  an absence  of  It or are very
ambiguous  about Its  enforcement.
The  advantages  provided  by  credit  groups  and  cooperatives  are  clearly
understood, as evident In the large number  that  have been established In the agricultural
sector  In nearly all countries  since their inception In Germany  In 1847 (see, Von Plschke
et  aL, E1983], Braverman  & Guasch  E1988a], and Bratton [1986]).  However,  results have
been mixed,  with failures  outnumbering  successes.  Perhaps that  should not  be terribly
surprising for  If the Incentive schemes  and design are not  set  "right", groups are prone
to  encourage the wrong '.Ind of  economic  behavior.  Joint liability and the fact  that some
of  the  actions  taken  by  group members  are  not  observable by  the  group,  and thus
cannot  be  contracted  for,  give  rise  to  moral hazard problems fostering  free  riding
behavior  and  thus  significant  inefficlencles.  These  problems are  enhanced In  the
presence  of  economy-wide external  shocks.1 5 Recent  results  In  the  theory  of
15As  the Israeli  experience  (Kislev,  Lerman  & Zusman  (1988])  demonstrates,  the viability  of the
credit cooperative  system  to withstand  extemal  shocks  may require  limited  joint liability. During  the
recent period of  high inflation  in  Israel, many members  of  the various  cooperatives  borrowed
extensively,  behaving  as "free  riders"  and expecting  somehow  that  the umbrella  organization  would  bail
them  out if conditions  changed  for the worst. In addilion  to regularly  extending  subsidized  credit,  the
government  stood ready to  bail out farmers  and their cooperative  organizations  whenever  they
experienced  financial  strains.  Assistance  usually  took the form of  loan rescheduling,  govemment
guarantees, etc.  Since  the govemment  consistently  aided  farmers  in financial  distress,  lenders  formed
the expectations  that such aid would always  be forthcoming. The moral hazard  phenomenon
associated  with joint liability  and the control  problems  characterizing  the cooperative  system  led then
to abusive  over investment.  As a result  the system  collapsed  following  the  control  of inflation  and  the
prevailing  high interest  rates.  Thus unlimited  joint liability without appropriate  monitoring  and
enforcement  has been  proven  ineffective.- 32  -
Incentives and teams addressing these concerns have developed allocation and Incentive
mechanisms  that when  Implemented  reduce or eliminate  those Inefficiencies (see Holmstrom
E1982], and Braverman  & Guasch  [1988]).  These schemes  usually require the setting  of
specific sharing  rule_ and penalties  or  fines for  the members  If  output fails below  a
certain specified level and can be sensitive to  the size of  the group.  Unless  these
schemes  are Implemented,  failure of  the credit group or the cooperatives  as a viable
institution will be the likely outcome.
The  high  failure rate of cooperatives  and credit groups  Is disconcerting,  not only
because  large amounts  of  resources have been Involved,  but also because  of  their
significance  In the process of economic  development  In rural areas and In Improving  the
plight  of the smallscale  farmers. A better understanding  of these institutions  and  of  the
factors most ccnducive  to  success  In each particular context Is warranted. From  the
empirical  and theoretical studies that  have addressed  that  Issue (see Braverman  &
Guasch  E1988] for  a more  elaborate  description  and references), the following  picture
emerges.  If  cooperatives and  credit  groups are  perceived as  purely nominal
organizations,  and If there Is a lack of  a sense of belonging  and of  Joint  responsibility
then that will hamper  the actions and faith of  the members. If  they lack efficient
administration  and are short  In  Incentives schemes,  members  are bound to  fall  In
compliance. If  there Is a  lack of  coordination  between  the  credit, marketing  and
production  activitles,  Inefficient  actlons will  be taken, Increasing  the likelihood  of failure.
A selective Incentive  or  a coercive sanction Is required to  enforce Joint liability and
maintain  group organization. Furtherirore,  a deficiency  of  proper monitoring  activities
coupled  with a perception  that credit funds are more  like grants or aid given by the
state will Induce  detachment,  high delinquency  rates and the Improper  usage of  funds.- 33  -
Finally,  If  the  cooperative  or  credit  group  maintains  an  attitude  that  tolerates  default
and that  does  not  Implement  or  enforce  tough  measures  against  non-compliers,  then  the
credibility  of  the  organization  Is  bound  to  be  questioned,  undermining  Its  chance  of
success.
The  belief  that  there  Is  plenty  of  room  for  Improvement and  that  a  properly
designed  Institution  of  cooperative  or  credit  groups  can  Increase  the  chances  of
success  considerably  Is  strongly  supported  by  the  theory  (see  Braverman  &  Guasch
(1988]),  and  by a  number of  success  stories  (I.e,  von  Pischke [1983]  for  a Kenya case
study,  Hossaln (1986]  for  an  analysis  of  the  Grameen Bank  In Bangladesh, or  Tendier  et
al., E1985] for  Nicaragua and of  course  a plethora  of  cases  In Korea,  Taiwan and Japan,
for  example Lee,  Kim &  Adams [1979];  see  also  Bratton  (1986]  for  a  comparlson  of
Individual and  group  credit  schemes In Zimbabwe). The key  Ingredients  of  such  success
are  a  coherent  system  of  Incentives,  appropriate  for  the  particular  Informational  and
Joint  liability  structure  of  the  cooperative  or  credit  group,  and  strong  enforcement
procedures.
In closing,  we should  assert  that  the  circumstances  In which different  countries
find  themselves  differ  considerably  such  that  no  single  prescription  would be appropriate
for  all.  Nonetheless,  these  recent  developments  In  Institutional  reform  might  prove
useful  In the  consideration  of  a wide range  of  cases.- 34  -
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